How accurately do structural asymmetric first-price auction estimates represent true valuations? (Q2181485): Difference between revisions

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Latest revision as of 09:18, 17 December 2024

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How accurately do structural asymmetric first-price auction estimates represent true valuations?
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    How accurately do structural asymmetric first-price auction estimates represent true valuations? (English)
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    19 May 2020
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    asymmetric auction
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    risk aversion
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    semi/nonparametric estimation
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    structural auction estimation
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