Maximal manipulation of envy-free solutions in economies with indivisible goods and money (Q896943): Difference between revisions

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Property / DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2015.03.014 / rank
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Latest revision as of 07:37, 10 December 2024

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English
Maximal manipulation of envy-free solutions in economies with indivisible goods and money
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    Maximal manipulation of envy-free solutions in economies with indivisible goods and money (English)
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    15 December 2015
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    envy-freeness
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    indivisible good
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    manipulation
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    Nash implementation
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