A simple selling and buying procedure (Q1601457): Difference between revisions

From MaRDI portal
Added link to MaRDI item.
Normalize DOI.
 
(4 intermediate revisions by 4 users not shown)
Property / DOI
 
Property / DOI: 10.1006/jeth.2000.2783 / rank
Normal rank
 
Property / MaRDI profile type
 
Property / MaRDI profile type: MaRDI publication profile / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / full work available at URL
 
Property / full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.2000.2783 / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / OpenAlex ID
 
Property / OpenAlex ID: W2039274946 / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Implementation of stable solutions to marriage problems / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Hiring procedures to implement stable allocations / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Simple mechanisms to implement the core of college admissions problems / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Q3066116 / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: The Strategy Structure of Two-Sided Matching Markets / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Machiavelli and the Gale-Shapley Algorithm / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Q5721624 / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Ms. Machiavelli and the Stable Matching Problem / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Non-cooperative matching games / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Job Matching, Coalition Formation, and Gross Substitutes / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Cooperative outcomes through noncooperative games / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: A Noncooperative View of Coalition Formation and the Core / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: The Economics of Matching: Stability and Incentives / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Misrepresentation and stability in the marriage problem / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Q3999327 / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: A market to implement the core / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: The assignment game. I: The core / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / DOI
 
Property / DOI: 10.1006/JETH.2000.2783 / rank
 
Normal rank

Latest revision as of 22:26, 10 December 2024

scientific article
Language Label Description Also known as
English
A simple selling and buying procedure
scientific article

    Statements

    A simple selling and buying procedure (English)
    0 references
    0 references
    0 references
    26 June 2002
    0 references
    matching model
    0 references
    assignment model
    0 references
    mechanism
    0 references
    implementation
    0 references

    Identifiers