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Property / full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2019.01.004 / rank
 
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Latest revision as of 07:51, 19 July 2024

scientific article
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Strategy-proof Pareto-improvement
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    Strategy-proof Pareto-improvement (English)
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    23 May 2019
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    strategy-proofness
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    Pareto-improvement
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    Pareto-constrained participation-maximality
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    school choice
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    pivotal mechanism
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