A class of multipartner matching markets with a strong lattice structure (Q1597936): Difference between revisions
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| Property / DOI: 10.1007/s001990100179 / rank | |||
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| Property / author: Ahmet U. Alkan / rank | |||
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| Property / reviewed by: Anton Stefanescu / rank | |||
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| Property / MaRDI profile type: MaRDI publication profile / rank | |||
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| Property / full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s001990100179 / rank | |||
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| Property / OpenAlex ID: W2126206231 / rank | |||
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| Property / DOI: 10.1007/S001990100179 / rank | |||
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Latest revision as of 22:16, 10 December 2024
scientific article
| Language | Label | Description | Also known as |
|---|---|---|---|
| English | A class of multipartner matching markets with a strong lattice structure |
scientific article |
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A class of multipartner matching markets with a strong lattice structure (English)
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4 June 2002
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It is proved that the set of stable matchings in a two-sided matching market is a distributive lattice under the common preferences of all agents on any one side of the market. The main conditions assumed are the path-independence and a new property called ``cardinal-monotonicity''.
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stable matchings
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choice function
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lattice
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