Decentralized information and the Walrasian outcome: A pairwise meetings market with private values. (Q1867764): Difference between revisions

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Latest revision as of 09:06, 30 July 2024

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Decentralized information and the Walrasian outcome: A pairwise meetings market with private values.
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    Decentralized information and the Walrasian outcome: A pairwise meetings market with private values. (English)
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    2 April 2003
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    The paper studies the equilibrium behaviour in a one-time entry market for a single indivisible good, where buyers and sellers, privately informed regarding their valuation for the good, are randomly matched, bargain and in the event of agreement, trade and exit the market.
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    decentralised markets
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    auctions
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    bargaining
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