Balancing the power to appoint officers (Q523016): Difference between revisions

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Property / DOI
 
Property / DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2015.10.005 / rank
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Property / author: Salvador Barberá / rank
 
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Property / MaRDI profile type: MaRDI publication profile / rank
 
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Property / OpenAlex ID: W2118937432 / rank
 
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Latest revision as of 20:21, 9 December 2024

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Balancing the power to appoint officers
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