Strategy-proof probabilistic decision schemes for one-dimensional single-peaked preferences (Q697846): Difference between revisions

From MaRDI portal
RedirectionBot (talk | contribs)
Removed claim: author (P16): Item:Q1070954
Normalize DOI.
 
(5 intermediate revisions by 5 users not shown)
Property / DOI
 
Property / DOI: 10.1006/jeth.2001.2829 / rank
Normal rank
 
Property / author
 
Property / author: H. J. M. Peters / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / MaRDI profile type
 
Property / MaRDI profile type: MaRDI publication profile / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / full work available at URL
 
Property / full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.2001.2829 / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / OpenAlex ID
 
Property / OpenAlex ID: W1971335524 / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Random Serial Dictatorship and the Core from Random Endowments in House Allocation Problems / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: The structure of coalitional power under probabilistic group decision rules / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Strategy-proof probabilistic rules for expected utility maximizers / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: A characterization of strategy-proof social choice functions for economies with pure public goods / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Preference aggregation with randomized social orderings / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: A new solution to the random assignment problem. / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Straightforward Elections, Unanimity and Phantom Voters / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Strategy-proofness and ``median voters'' / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Strategic Voting in a Probabilistic Framework / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: A cardinal approach to straightforward probabilistic mechanisms / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Manipulation of Schemes that Mix Voting with Chance / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Straightforwardness of Game Forms with Lotteries as Outcomes / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Distribution of Power under Stochastic Social Choice Rules / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / DOI
 
Property / DOI: 10.1006/JETH.2001.2829 / rank
 
Normal rank

Latest revision as of 01:02, 10 December 2024

scientific article
Language Label Description Also known as
English
Strategy-proof probabilistic decision schemes for one-dimensional single-peaked preferences
scientific article

    Statements

    Strategy-proof probabilistic decision schemes for one-dimensional single-peaked preferences (English)
    0 references
    0 references
    0 references
    0 references
    17 September 2002
    0 references
    Some results about the characterization of the class of unanimous and strategy-proof probabilistic schemes with the aid of fixed probability distributions are offered. Also a certain work (by H. Moulin) is extended to the probabilistic framework.
    0 references

    Identifiers

    0 references
    0 references
    0 references
    0 references
    0 references