Power indices for multicandidate voting games (Q1087481): Difference between revisions
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Property / cites work: The Banzhaf Index for Multicandidate Presidential Elections / rank | |||
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Property / cites work: N‐person games in partition function form / rank | |||
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Property / cites work: Values of games in partition function form / rank | |||
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Property / full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/bf01769257 / rank | |||
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Latest revision as of 11:32, 30 July 2024
scientific article
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English | Power indices for multicandidate voting games |
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Power indices for multicandidate voting games (English)
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1986
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Let N be a finite set of players with cardinality n, and (N,v) a proper simple game. Let R be a finite set of candidates (R\(\subset N)\) with cardinality r. Let P be a partition of N into at most r coalitions, each of which represents the backing for one of the candidates. A candidate is winning if his supporting coalition is winning in the simple game v in partition function form. A player is pivotal if a change in his support for a candidate changes the winning candidate. A player who is never pivotal is a dummy. This paper introduces a power index for the above class of multi- candidate voting games. This power index is based on the count of a player's ordered pivot moves. The main result is that this is the unique power index satisfying the dummy, linearity, and efficiency axioms on the class of voting games.
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simple game
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supporting coalition
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power index
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multi-candidate voting games
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