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Property / author: Arkadii M. Slinko / rank
 
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Property / OpenAlex ID: W2962767360 / rank
 
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Property / arXiv ID: 1707.05619 / rank
 
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Latest revision as of 22:26, 20 July 2024

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Gibbard-Satterthwaite games for \(k\)-approval voting rules
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    Gibbard-Satterthwaite games for \(k\)-approval voting rules (English)
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    8 November 2019
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    Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem
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    voting manipulation games
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    countermanipulators
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