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Property / full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1155/2013/290427 / rank
 
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Latest revision as of 02:09, 9 July 2024

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A necessary condition for Nash equilibrium in two-person zero-sum constrained stochastic games
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    A necessary condition for Nash equilibrium in two-person zero-sum constrained stochastic games (English)
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    30 September 2014
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    Summary: We provide a necessary condition that a constrained Nash-equilibrium (CNE) policy pair satisfies in two-person zero-sum constrained stochastic discounted-payoff games and discuss a general method of approximating CNE based on the condition.
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