Generalized solution concepts in games with possibly unaware players (Q662271): Difference between revisions

In the paper under review, the authors take the material from versions presented at conferences and the earlier work available on the website arxiv.org. So, they review standard notions of extensive-form games and suggest modeling concepts for games with possibly unaware players. Their intention is to generalize different concepts, including \textit{perfect equilibrium} (Selten 1975), \textit{proper equilibrium} (Myerson 1978), \textit{sequential equilibrium} (Kreps and Wilson 1982) or \textit{rationalizability} (Berheim 1984; Pearce 1984), etc. Their experience entitles them to improve the notion of sequential equilibrium, compare [Econometrica 50, 863--894 (1982; Zbl 0483.90092)]. They introduce the notion called \textit{conditional sequential equilibrium}, which captures situations where a player is certain that some histories in his information set will not occur (having probability zero, are ignored in uncorrected conceptions). The narrative of the article is a philosophical description of long formal definitions. It explains their significance, forcing the comparison with comments listed elsewhere. The appendix contains notes about extensive games with countably many players.