Stability and segregation in group formation (Q700120): Difference between revisions

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Latest revision as of 16:37, 4 June 2024

scientific article
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English
Stability and segregation in group formation
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    Stability and segregation in group formation (English)
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    30 September 2002
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    group formation
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    coalition structure
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    local public goods
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    segregation
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    myopic optimization
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    weak acyclicity
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    Identifiers

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