Incentive compatibility in a market with indivisible goods (Q756630): Difference between revisions
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| Property / full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-1765(82)90003-9 / rank | |||
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| Property / OpenAlex ID: W2017097737 / rank | |||
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| Property / cites work: College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage / rank | |||
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| Property / cites work: The Economics of Matching: Stability and Incentives / rank | |||
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Latest revision as of 14:09, 21 June 2024
scientific article
| Language | Label | Description | Also known as |
|---|---|---|---|
| English | Incentive compatibility in a market with indivisible goods |
scientific article |
Statements
Incentive compatibility in a market with indivisible goods (English)
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1982
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The author considers an exchange model in which each agent has an initial endowment of one unit of an indivisible good. He constructs an incentive compatible procedure for achieving a competitive equilibrium.
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exchange model
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indivisible good
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incentive compatible procedure
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