Stability of topological effectivity functions (Q1096517): Difference between revisions

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Latest revision as of 12:54, 18 June 2024

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Stability of topological effectivity functions
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    Stability of topological effectivity functions (English)
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    1987
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    Stability of effectivity functions on a topological space of alternatives is considered. Previous results proved by two authors are related to each other. Special attention is brought to the notions of cycle, upper and lower cycle. Examples of EFs with an infinite alternative space in social choice and economic theory are provided. Finally we prove by a direct method that the core of a convex topological EF is nonempty for any continuous preference relation.
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    Stability of effectivity functions
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    topological space of alternatives
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    core
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    convex topological EF
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    continuous preference relation
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