Some refinements of Nash equilibria of large games (Q1329909): Difference between revisions
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Latest revision as of 18:35, 19 March 2024
scientific article
| Language | Label | Description | Also known as |
|---|---|---|---|
| English | Some refinements of Nash equilibria of large games |
scientific article |
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Some refinements of Nash equilibria of large games (English)
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9 August 1994
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Refinements of the Nash equilibrium such as perfect, proper and persistent equilibria for finite player games introduced by R. Selten (1975), R. B. Myerson (1978) and E. Kalai and D. Samet (1984) respectively are defined for large games (i.e. games with a continuum of players and finite actions. It is shown that every large game has a perfect and proper equilibrium. An example of a large game with a unique Nash equilibrium but no persistent equilibrium is given.
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perfect equilibrium
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continuum of players
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finite actions
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large game
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proper equilibrium
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Nash equilibrium
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persistent equilibrium
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