A maximal domain for the existence of strategy-proof rules (Q1381966): Difference between revisions

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Property / full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.1997.2337 / rank
 
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Latest revision as of 10:57, 28 May 2024

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A maximal domain for the existence of strategy-proof rules
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