An evolutionary approach to explaining cooperative behavior by reciprocal incentives (Q1905051): Difference between revisions

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+Games with Incomplete Information Played by “Bayesian” Players, I–III Part I. The Basic Model
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+https://doi.org/10.1007/bf01243036
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