Common value elections with private information and informative priors: theory and experiments (Q2013342): Difference between revisions

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Latest revision as of 06:19, 14 July 2024

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Common value elections with private information and informative priors: theory and experiments
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    Common value elections with private information and informative priors: theory and experiments (English)
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    17 August 2017
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    voter turnout
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    common value elections
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    private information
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    swing voter's curse
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    Condorcet jury theorem
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