The Egalitarian Shapley value: a generalization based on coalition sizes (Q2241241): Difference between revisions

This paper considers \(n\)-person games in the characteristic function form or transferable utility games. In one of these games, a set of agents pursue a common benefit and each coalition can make a profit regardless of the remaining agents. An example is the execution of a project, so that the coalition building can generate savings for its members, or an institution where decisions are made by majority. It is common that the coalition is eventually formed by all the agents or players so that different values or solution concepts have been defined that prescribe a fair distribution of the value of the total coalition among all its members. Two of the most prominent values are the Shapley value [\textit{L. S. Shapley}, Ann. Math. Stud. No. 28, 307--317 (1953; Zbl 0050.14404)] and the equal division rule based on marginality or equality principles, respectively. In this paper, they are defined the so-called generalized egalitarian Shapley values, which combine the two previous values and are based on allowing some flexibility to Shapley value marginalism by making use of the size of coalitions. The motivation lies in the evidence that small groups or companies distribute their resources or benefits according to solidarity and egalitarian criteria, while when moving to large groups or companies, marginalism becomes the criteria to be applied. The generalized egalitarian Shapley values can be considered as successors of the \(\alpha\)-egalitarian Shapley value [\textit{R. Joosten}, in: Ten years LNMB. Ph.D. research and graduate courses of the Dutch network of operations research. Amsterdam: CWI. 217--221 (1997; Zbl 0884.90146)] which is a convex combination with real coefficient \(\alpha\) of the Shapley value and the equal division rule. Apart from the intuition of the definition, the new solution presented in the paper is justified by means of two axiomatic characterisations. The key axiom is based on a criterion of solidarity with players such that all coalitions to which they belong have a non-negative value. This property has the same flavour, albeit weaker, as another one presented in [\textit{A. Casajus} and \textit{F. Huettner}, J. Econ. Theory 154, 162--172 (2014; Zbl 1309.91010)]. As a preliminary step to the axiomatic characterisations of the new value, some of the axiomatic characterisations of the \(\alpha\)-egalitarian Shapley value are reviewed. The generalized egalitarian Shapley values are also a subclass of the so-called ESL values. A comparison of the different solutions studied in this article when applied to a real-life problem might be of interest. It is also worth noting that the new solution presented inherits the problems of computing the Shapley value, and therefore calls for research aimed at calculating it efficiently.