Equivalence of strong and coalition-proof Nash equilibria in games without spillovers (Q2365070): Difference between revisions

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Latest revision as of 10:37, 27 May 2024

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Equivalence of strong and coalition-proof Nash equilibria in games without spillovers
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    Equivalence of strong and coalition-proof Nash equilibria in games without spillovers (English)
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    26 October 1997
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    coalition-proof Nash equilibria
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    strong Nash equilibria
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    spillovers
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