On the Condorcet Efficiency of Approval Voting and Extended Scoring Rules for Three Alternatives (Q2829684): Difference between revisions

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+https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-02839-7_11
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+W18328610
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+Aggregation of Preferences with Variable Electorate
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+Probabilities of election outcomes for large electorates
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+Robustness of positional scoring over subsets of alternatives
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+The Borda method is most likely to respect the Condorcet principle
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+On the relationship of the Condorcet winner and positional voting rules
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+The Condorcet efficiency of approval voting and the probability of electing the Condorcet loser
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+The likelihood of dubious election outcomes
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+Analytical representation of probabilities under the IAC condition
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+Condorcet efficiency: A preference for indifference
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+The impact of indifferent voters on the likelihood of some voting paradoxes
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+Which scoring rule maximizes condorcet efficiency under IAC?
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+On Ehrhart polynomials and probability calculations in voting theory
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