Some Remarks on Bayesian Mechanism Design (Q5111103): Difference between revisions

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Latest revision as of 19:14, 22 July 2024

scientific article; zbMATH DE number 7204217
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English
Some Remarks on Bayesian Mechanism Design
scientific article; zbMATH DE number 7204217

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    Some Remarks on Bayesian Mechanism Design (English)
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    26 May 2020
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    Bayesian mechanism design
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