Mechanism design with multidimensional, continuous types and interdependent valuations (Q2455672): Difference between revisions

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+Correlated types and Bayesian incentive compatible mechanisms with budget balance
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+Q5722776
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+Optimal Selling Strategies under Uncertainty for a Discriminating Monopolist when Demands are Interdependent
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+Full Extraction of the Surplus in Bayesian and Dominant Strategy Auctions
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+Bayesian incentive compatible beliefs
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+Linear inequality methods to enforce partnerships under uncertainty: An overview
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+Incentives and the existence of Pareto-optimal revelation mechanisms
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+Efficient Auctions
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+Characterization of Satisfactory Mechanisms for the Revelation of Preferences for Public Goods
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+Incentives in Teams
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+On the Generic (Im)Possibility of Full Surplus Extraction in Mechanism Design
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+A crash course in implementation theory
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+The Limits of ex post Implementation
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+Efficient Design with Interdependent Valuations
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+Efficiency Despite Mutually Payoff-Relevant Private Information: The Finite Case
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+Q3137759
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+Dominant strategy mechanisms with mutually payoff-relevant private information and with public information
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+Incentive compatible mechanisms with full transferability
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+Correlated Information and Mecanism Design
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+Informational Size and Efficient Auctions
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+On the existence of equilibria to Bayesian games with non-finite type and action spaces
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+Mechanism Design with Interdependent Valuations: Efficiency
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+The relevance of private information in mechanism design
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+Axiomatic characterization of the quadratic scoring rule
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