Auctioning or assigning an object: some remarkable VCG mechanisms (Q2268363): Difference between revisions

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Latest revision as of 13:08, 2 July 2024

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Auctioning or assigning an object: some remarkable VCG mechanisms
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    Auctioning or assigning an object: some remarkable VCG mechanisms (English)
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    5 March 2010
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