Stability of marriage with externalities (Q956582): Difference between revisions
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Property / cites work: Sequential formation of coalitions in games with externalities and fixed payoff division / rank | |||
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Property / cites work: College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage / rank | |||
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Property / cites work: Weak stability and a bargaining set for the marriage model / rank | |||
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Latest revision as of 20:12, 28 June 2024
scientific article
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English | Stability of marriage with externalities |
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Stability of marriage with externalities (English)
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25 November 2008
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Endogenously introduced beliefs are introduced into a matching game. Sufficient conditions for the estimation functions to be compatible with the existence stable matching are derived. A particular notion of beliefs (called sophisticated expectations) is introduced. It is shown that with them, stable matching always exist. An algorithm to determine them is given. A generalization of the concept of core is given. It is called the bargaining set. A sufficient condition on the preferences to ensure that it is nonempty is provided.
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cooperative games
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matching
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externalities
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