Efficiency and strategy-proofness in object assignment problems with multi-demand preferences (Q682485): Difference between revisions

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Latest revision as of 00:45, 10 December 2024

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Efficiency and strategy-proofness in object assignment problems with multi-demand preferences
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    Efficiency and strategy-proofness in object assignment problems with multi-demand preferences (English)
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    2 February 2018
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    strategy-proofness
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    efficiency
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    multi-demand preferences
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    unit-demand preferences
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    non-quasi-linear preferences
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    minimum price Walrasian rule
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