Fair implementation of diversity in school choice (Q290161): Difference between revisions

@@ Property / DOI @@
-.1016/j.geb.2016.03.003
@@ Property / DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2016.03.003 / rank @@
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@@ Property / Mathematics Subject Classification ID @@
+B68
@@ Property / Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B68 / rank @@
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@@ Property / zbMATH DE Number @@
+6588256
@@ Property / zbMATH DE Number: 6588256 / rank @@
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@@ Property / zbMATH Keywords @@
+mechanism design
@@ Property / zbMATH Keywords: mechanism design / rank @@
+Normal rank
@@ Property / zbMATH Keywords @@
+matching
@@ Property / zbMATH Keywords: matching / rank @@
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@@ Property / zbMATH Keywords @@
+school choice
@@ Property / zbMATH Keywords: school choice / rank @@
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@@ Property / zbMATH Keywords @@
+affirmative action
@@ Property / zbMATH Keywords: affirmative action / rank @@
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@@ Property / zbMATH Keywords @@
+diversity
@@ Property / zbMATH Keywords: diversity / rank @@
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@@ Property / MaRDI profile type @@
+MaRDI publication profile
@@ Property / MaRDI profile type: MaRDI publication profile / rank @@
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@@ Property / OpenAlex ID @@
+W2320344639
@@ Property / OpenAlex ID: W2320344639 / rank @@
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@@ Property / cites work @@
+College admissions with affirmative action
@@ Property / cites work: College admissions with affirmative action / rank @@
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@@ Property / cites work @@
+A class of multipartner matching markets with a strong lattice structure
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@@ Property / cites work @@
+A tale of two mechanisms: Student placement
@@ Property / cites work: A tale of two mechanisms: Student placement / rank @@
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@@ Property / cites work @@
+Machiavelli and the Gale-Shapley Algorithm
@@ Property / cites work: Machiavelli and the Gale-Shapley Algorithm / rank @@
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@@ Property / cites work @@
+School choice with controlled choice constraints: hard bounds versus soft bounds
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@@ Property / cites work @@
+College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
@@ Property / cites work: College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage / rank @@
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@@ Property / cites work @@
+Ms. Machiavelli and the Stable Matching Problem
@@ Property / cites work: Ms. Machiavelli and the Stable Matching Problem / rank @@
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@@ Property / cites work @@
+Effective affirmative action in school choice
@@ Property / cites work: Effective affirmative action in school choice / rank @@
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@@ Property / cites work @@
+Substitutes and stability for matching with contracts
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@@ Property / cites work @@
+Stability and Polarization of Interests in Job Matching
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@@ Property / cites work @@
+The college admissions problem is not equivalent to the marriage problem
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@@ Property / cites work @@
+An analysis of the German university admissions system
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@@ Property / DOI @@
+.1016/J.GEB.2016.03.003
@@ Property / DOI: 10.1016/J.GEB.2016.03.003 / rank @@
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@@ links / mardi / name / links / mardi / name @@
+Publication:290161