A class of multipartner matching markets with a strong lattice structure (Q1597936): Difference between revisions

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Latest revision as of 22:16, 10 December 2024

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A class of multipartner matching markets with a strong lattice structure
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    A class of multipartner matching markets with a strong lattice structure (English)
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    4 June 2002
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    It is proved that the set of stable matchings in a two-sided matching market is a distributive lattice under the common preferences of all agents on any one side of the market. The main conditions assumed are the path-independence and a new property called ``cardinal-monotonicity''.
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    stable matchings
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    choice function
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    lattice
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