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Property / author: Nikhil Srivastava / rank
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Property / author: Nikhil Srivastava / rank
 
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Latest revision as of 16:50, 5 July 2024

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Voting with rubber bands, weights, and strings
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    Voting with rubber bands, weights, and strings (English)
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    11 September 2012
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