Balancing the power to appoint officers (Q523016): Difference between revisions

@@ Property / author @@
-Salvador Barberá
@@ Property / author: Salvador Barberá / rank @@
-Normal rank
@@ Property / author @@
+Salvador Barberá
@@ Property / author: Salvador Barberá / rank @@
+Normal rank
@@ Property / Mathematics Subject Classification ID @@
+B14
@@ Property / Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B14 / rank @@
+Normal rank
@@ Property / zbMATH DE Number @@
+6706396
@@ Property / zbMATH DE Number: 6706396 / rank @@
+Normal rank
@@ Property / zbMATH Keywords @@
+voting rules
@@ Property / zbMATH Keywords: voting rules / rank @@
+Normal rank
@@ Property / zbMATH Keywords @@
+constitutional design
@@ Property / zbMATH Keywords: constitutional design / rank @@
+Normal rank
@@ Property / zbMATH Keywords @@
+strong Nash equilibrium
@@ Property / zbMATH Keywords: strong Nash equilibrium / rank @@
+Normal rank
@@ Property / zbMATH Keywords @@
+rule of \(k\) names
@@ Property / zbMATH Keywords: rule of \(k\) names / rank @@
+Normal rank
@@ Property / MaRDI profile type @@
+MaRDI publication profile
@@ Property / MaRDI profile type: MaRDI publication profile / rank @@
+Normal rank
@@ Property / OpenAlex ID @@
+W2118937432
@@ Property / OpenAlex ID: W2118937432 / rank @@
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Q4003461
@@ Property / cites work: Q4003461 / rank @@
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+How to choose a non-controversial list with \(k\) names
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+On the rule of \(k\) names
@@ Property / cites work: On the rule of \(k\) names / rank @@
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Choosing How to Choose: Self-Stable Majority Rules and Constitutions
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Binding Versus Final-Offer Arbitration: A Combination is Best
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Voting games of resolute social choice correspondences
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+The Condorcet criterion and committee selection
@@ Property / cites work: The Condorcet criterion and committee selection / rank @@
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Impartial Nominations for a Prize
@@ Property / cites work: Impartial Nominations for a Prize / rank @@
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Voting with Proportional Veto Power
@@ Property / cites work: Voting with Proportional Veto Power / rank @@
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Cores of effectivity functions and implementation theory
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Q3677437
@@ Property / cites work: Q3677437 / rank @@
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Strong and coalition-proof political equilibria under plurality and runoff rule
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Strong equilibrium outcomes of voting games are the generalized Condorcet winners
+Normal rank
@@ links / mardi / name / links / mardi / name @@
+Publication:523016