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Property / DOI: 10.1007/s00355-014-0813-z / rank
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Latest revision as of 18:56, 9 December 2024

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Implications of capacity reduction and entry in many-to-one stable matching
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    Implications of capacity reduction and entry in many-to-one stable matching (English)
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    9 January 2015
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