Implementation in mixed Nash equilibrium (Q694739): Difference between revisions
From MaRDI portal
Added link to MaRDI item. |
Set profile property. |
||
| Property / MaRDI profile type | |||
| Property / MaRDI profile type: MaRDI publication profile / rank | |||
Normal rank | |||
Revision as of 00:59, 5 March 2024
scientific article
| Language | Label | Description | Also known as |
|---|---|---|---|
| English | Implementation in mixed Nash equilibrium |
scientific article |
Statements
Implementation in mixed Nash equilibrium (English)
0 references
13 December 2012
0 references
This paper works on a concept derived from Maskin's definition of implementation. The new approach is developed by allowing for mixed equilibria as outcomes. A necessary condition for social choice correspondences implementation in the new sense, named set-monotonicity, is established. Set-monotonicity and no veto-power are, on the other way, sufficient to guarantee implementation in mixed Nash equilibrium, in environments with at least three players.
0 references
implementation
0 references
Maskin monotonicity
0 references
set-monotonicity
0 references
social choice correspondence
0 references
pure and mixed Nash equilibrium
0 references
