Some refinements of Nash equilibria of large games (Q1329909): Difference between revisions
From MaRDI portal
Added link to MaRDI item. |
Removed claim: reviewed by (P1447): Item:Q1108394 |
||
| Property / reviewed by | |||
| Property / reviewed by: Werner J. A. Stich / rank | |||
Revision as of 04:46, 22 February 2024
scientific article
| Language | Label | Description | Also known as |
|---|---|---|---|
| English | Some refinements of Nash equilibria of large games |
scientific article |
Statements
Some refinements of Nash equilibria of large games (English)
0 references
9 August 1994
0 references
Refinements of the Nash equilibrium such as perfect, proper and persistent equilibria for finite player games introduced by R. Selten (1975), R. B. Myerson (1978) and E. Kalai and D. Samet (1984) respectively are defined for large games (i.e. games with a continuum of players and finite actions. It is shown that every large game has a perfect and proper equilibrium. An example of a large game with a unique Nash equilibrium but no persistent equilibrium is given.
0 references
perfect equilibrium
0 references
continuum of players
0 references
finite actions
0 references
large game
0 references
proper equilibrium
0 references
Nash equilibrium
0 references
persistent equilibrium
0 references
