Monotonicity of the core and value in dynamic cooperative games (Q2641231): Difference between revisions
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Revision as of 07:56, 5 March 2024
scientific article
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English | Monotonicity of the core and value in dynamic cooperative games |
scientific article |
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Monotonicity of the core and value in dynamic cooperative games (English)
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1990
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Let N be a finite player-set, \(k\not\in N\), and let \(N':=N\cup \{k\}\). First, two super-additive side-payment games, v defined on the coalitions in N and w defined on the coalitions in \(N'\) satisfying \(v(S)=w(S)\) for all \(S\subset N\), are compared in terms of solution concepts: (1) The Shapley value is monotone if w is convex. (2) The Shapley value is monotone and there is a monotone selection of the core, if w is a flow game such that k is a player in the minimum cut of the new network. Second, two non-side-payment games, V defined on \(2^ N\) and W defined on \(2^{N'}\) satisfying \(V(S)=W(S)\) for all \(S\subset N\), are compared: (1) The (generalized) Shapley value defined by applying the greedy algorithm is monotone if W is a convex hyperplane game.
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monotonicity
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super-additive side-payment games
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Shapley value
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core
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flow game
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non-side-payment games
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greedy algorithm
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convex hyperplane game
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