Permutation cycles and manipulation of choice functions (Q1083004): Difference between revisions
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Revision as of 08:44, 20 February 2024
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English | Permutation cycles and manipulation of choice functions |
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Permutation cycles and manipulation of choice functions (English)
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1986
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If \(\sigma\) is a social preference function which assigns to profiles of strict acyclic preferences a strict preference, and if the set of alternatives W is finite with cardinality w, \(w<v(\sigma)=\) Nakamura number of \(\sigma\) is a necessary and sufficient condition for the non- existence of cycles and the existence of a core. Then it is shown that if \(w\geq v(\sigma)\) then \(\sigma\) can be manipulated (there exist cases in which a voter can improve the outcome for himself by reporting a false preference). Finally a similar result holds when W is a smooth manifold with dimension at least v(\(\sigma)\)-1.
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voting rules
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manipulation
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social preference function
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strict acyclic preferences
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non-existence of cycles
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existence of a core
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smooth manifold
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