Optimal cartel equilibria with imperfect monitoring (Q1085032): Difference between revisions
From MaRDI portal
Changed an Item |
Set profile property. |
||
Property / MaRDI profile type | |||
Property / MaRDI profile type: MaRDI publication profile / rank | |||
Normal rank |
Revision as of 03:08, 5 March 2024
scientific article
Language | Label | Description | Also known as |
---|---|---|---|
English | Optimal cartel equilibria with imperfect monitoring |
scientific article |
Statements
Optimal cartel equilibria with imperfect monitoring (English)
0 references
1986
0 references
There exist optimal symmetric equilibria in the Green-Porter model [see \textit{E. J. Green} and \textit{R. H. Porter}, Econometrica 52, 87-100 (1984; Zbl 0526.90013) and \textit{R. H. Porter}, J. Econ. Theory 29, 313-338 (1983; Zbl 0511.90020)] having an elementary intertemporal structure. Such an equilibrium is described entirely by two subsets of price space and two quantities, the only production levels used by firms in any contingency. The central technique employed in the analysis is the reduction of the repeated game to a family of static games.
0 references
optimal symmetric equilibria
0 references
reduction of the repeated game
0 references
family of static games
0 references