Learning in games by random sampling (Q5938633): Difference between revisions
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Revision as of 03:22, 20 March 2024
scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1623179
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English | Learning in games by random sampling |
scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1623179 |
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Learning in games by random sampling (English)
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23 July 2001
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The authors study repeated interactions among a fixed set of ``low rationality'' players who have status quo actions, randomly sample other actions, and change their status quo if the sampled action yields a higher payoff. This behavior generates a random process, the better-reply dynamics. Long run behaviour leads to Nash equilibrium in games with the weak finite improvement property, including finite, supermodular games and generic, continuous, two-player, quasi-concave games. If the players make mistakes and if several players can sample at the same time, the resulting better-reply dynamics with simultaneous sampling converges to the Pareto optimal Nash equilibrium in common interest games.
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strategic games
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bounded rationality
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repeated interactions
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Nash equilibrium
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