Private provision of discrete public goods with incomplete information (Q5954780): Difference between revisions

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Revision as of 22:37, 3 June 2024

scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1701816
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English
Private provision of discrete public goods with incomplete information
scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1701816

    Statements

    Private provision of discrete public goods with incomplete information (English)
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    6 November 2002
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    The private provision of discrete public goods is studied in situations of incomplete information and continuous contributions. Two scenarios are considered, one where contributions are not refunded if the project is not completed and the other where contributions are reunded. It is shown that in the former case, if cost is high enough, there are only strong free riding equilibria. Several equilibria of both types of situations are studied and a new proof ex-post inefficiency is given.
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    public good
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    contribution game
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    subscription game
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    incomplete information
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