Second price auctions on general preference domains: two characterizations (Q946368): Difference between revisions
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Revision as of 14:22, 19 March 2024
scientific article
| Language | Label | Description | Also known as |
|---|---|---|---|
| English | Second price auctions on general preference domains: two characterizations |
scientific article |
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Second price auctions on general preference domains: two characterizations (English)
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23 September 2008
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The author considers auction theory. Auction theory usually assumes that bidders have quasi-linear preferences. In this article the existence and characterization of desirable auction rules for non-quasi-linear preference is investigated. It is shown that second price mechanisms (Vickrey mechanism) can be generalized by the use of the maximum willingness to pay, and the rules so generalized are still the only rules satisfying the sets of axioms characterizing second price mechanism.
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second price mechanism
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Vickrey mechanism
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non-quasi-linear preference
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auction theory
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envy-freeness
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