A note on the one-deviation property in extensive form games (Q1864819): Difference between revisions

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Revision as of 13:09, 5 June 2024

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A note on the one-deviation property in extensive form games
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    A note on the one-deviation property in extensive form games (English)
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    23 March 2003
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    The main aim of this research note is to establish and apply a characterization of the phenomenon that a stream of locally optimal decisions represents a globally optimal decisions stream, named as the one-deviation property or the one-shot deviation principle, under the appropriate weakening of preconsistency represented by the updating consistency. The result which characterizes the assessments which satisfy the one-deviation property is applied also in the context of the updating systems. The significant references suggest the corresponding extension to the equilibria of the dynamical systems.
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    extensive form game
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    deviation property
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    rationality
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    rationalizability
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    updating system
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