Existence of stable outcomes and the lattice property for a unified matching market (Q1974049): Difference between revisions

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+The Strategy Structure of Two-Sided Matching Markets
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+Stable matching in a common generalization of the marriage and assignment models
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+College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
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+The central assignment game and the assignment markets
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+Q4130997
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+Stable Matchings, Optimal Assignments, and Linear Programming
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+Q3999327
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+Characterization of stable matchings as extreme points of a polytope
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+The assignment game. I: The core
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+A nonconstructive elementary proof of the existence of stable marriages
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+Linear programming brings marital bliss
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