On a conjecture by Gale about one-sided matching problems (Q2277345): Difference between revisions
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Latest revision as of 16:34, 21 June 2024
scientific article
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English | On a conjecture by Gale about one-sided matching problems |
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On a conjecture by Gale about one-sided matching problems (English)
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1990
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Matching problems are decision problems involving the assignment of n objects to n agents. A mechanism is a rule for making such matching and matchings are allowed to be a probability distribution over pure matchings. This paper shows that for \(n\geq 3\), there exists no mechanism which satisfies symmetry, Pareto optimality and strategy-proofness. Some extensions of this result to more general matching problems are also considered.
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Matching problems
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assignment
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probability distribution over pure matchings
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symmetry
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Pareto optimality
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strategy-proofness
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