Stability of solutions for Ky Fan's section theorem with some applications (Q2488254): Difference between revisions

Let \(X\) be a nonempty compact convex subset of a normed vector space, \(E\) a subset of \(X \times X\) such that: (i) for each fixed \(x \in X\), \((x,x) \in E\); (ii) for each fixed \(x \in X\), the set \(\{y \in X: (x,y) \in E \}\) is closed; (iii) for each fixed \(y \in X\), the set \(\{x \in X: (x,y) \notin E \}\) is convex (possibly empty). The authors study the stability of the solution set \(\bigcap_{x\in X} \{y \in X: (x,y) \in E\}\) with respect to a varying set \(E\). As application, the stability of Nash equilibrium sets in noncooperative games with nonconcave payoffs is considered.