A new proof of the lattice structure of many-to-many pairwise-stable matchings (Q489140): Difference between revisions

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+A class of multipartner matching markets with a strong lattice structure
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+The Lattice Structure of the Set of Stable Matchings with Multiple Partners
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+College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
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+Contract design and stability in many-to-many matching
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+Job Matching, Coalition Formation, and Gross Substitutes
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+Credible group stability in many-to-many matching problems
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+A Note on Roth's Consensus Property of Many-to-One Matching
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+Stability and Polarization of Interests in Job Matching
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+Conflict and Coincidence of Interest in Job Matching: Some New Results and Open Questions
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+The college admissions problem is not equivalent to the marriage problem
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+Three remarks on the many-to-many stable matching problem
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