Notions of anonymity for object assignment: impossibility theorems (Q2299463): Difference between revisions

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+House allocation with existing tenants
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+A short proof for the characterization of the core in housing markets
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+A new solution to the random assignment problem.
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+Coalitional strategy-proof house allocation
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+Strategy-proof, efficient, and nonbossy quota allocations
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+Probabilistic assignment of indivisible goods with single-peaked preferences
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+The Pareto-dominant strategy-proof and fair rule for problems with indivisible goods
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+Strategy-proofness and the core in house allocation problems
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+Strategyproof Assignment by Hierarchical Exchange
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+On cores and indivisibility
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+Strategy-proof allocation of indivisible goods
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+Coalition strategy-proofness and monotonicity in Shapley-Scarf housing markets
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