A mechanism implementing the stable rule in marriage problems (Q1350573): Difference between revisions
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Latest revision as of 11:06, 27 May 2024
scientific article
Language | Label | Description | Also known as |
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English | A mechanism implementing the stable rule in marriage problems |
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Statements
A mechanism implementing the stable rule in marriage problems (English)
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27 February 1997
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Matching
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Stable rule
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Strong Nash equilibrium
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