A characterization of the perfect equilibria of infinite horizon games (Q1072945): Difference between revisions
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Latest revision as of 13:20, 17 June 2024
scientific article
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English | A characterization of the perfect equilibria of infinite horizon games |
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A characterization of the perfect equilibria of infinite horizon games (English)
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1985
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The paper extends the ideas of \textit{D. Fudenberg} and \textit{D. Levine} [ibid. 31, 251-268 (1983; Zbl 0521.90106)] who have made the following observation: under some circumstances, in an infinite extensive game of n players \(\Gamma\), a sequence of players' strategies is a perfect equilibrium of \(\Gamma\) if and only if it is a limit of a sequence of \(\epsilon_ n\)-perfect equilibria of truncated games \(\Gamma_ n\) \((\Gamma_ n\) arises from \(\Gamma\) by truncating it after n steps), with \(\epsilon_ n\to 0\) while \(n\to \infty.\) The original concept of convergence w.r.t. a metric has been replaced in the paper under review by the convergence w.r.t. a ''weak'' and a ''strong'' topology in the set of all sequences of players' strategies, and w.r.t. any topology in between.
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infinite horizon games
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convergence of equilibria
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limit strategies
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limit equilibria
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convergence with respect to a topology
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infinite extensive game
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perfect equilibrium
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truncated games
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