The repeated prisoner's dilemma with imperfect private monitoring (Q1604519): Difference between revisions

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Latest revision as of 11:33, 4 June 2024

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The repeated prisoner's dilemma with imperfect private monitoring
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    The repeated prisoner's dilemma with imperfect private monitoring (English)
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    4 July 2002
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    The aim of this paper is to analyze a repeated prisoner's dilemma game in which the actions of the players are monitored privately and imperfectly. A partial folk theorem is proved for the case of almost perfect monitoring.
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    repeated prisoner's dilemma
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    folk theorem
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