Stability and voting by committees with exit (Q1762858): Difference between revisions

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Stability and voting by committees with exit
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    Stability and voting by committees with exit (English)
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    11 February 2005
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    The problem of a society choosing a subset of new members from a finite set of candidates is studied. The possibility that initial members of the society (founders) may want to leave it if they do not like the resulting new society is explicitly considered. It is shown that, if founders have separable (or additive) preferences, the unique strategy-proof and stable social choice function satisfying founders' sovereignty (on the set of candidates) is the one where candidates are chosen unanimously and no founder leaves the society.
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